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Abstract:  
This paper argues that, while they are often conflated, the right to freedom of religion and the 
right against religious discrimination are in fact distinct human rights. Religious freedom is 
best understood as protecting our interest in religious adherence (and non-adherence), 
understood from the committed perspective of the (non)adherent. The right against religious 
discrimination is best understood as protecting our non-committal interest in the unsaddled 
membership of our religious group. Thus understood, the two rights have distinct normative 
rationales. Key doctrinal implications follow for the respective scope of the two rights, whether 
they may be claimed against non-state actors, and their divergent assessment of religious 
establishment. These differences reveal a complex map of two overlapping, but conceptually 
distinct, human rights which are not necessarily breached simultaneously. 
1. Introduction 
We live in a post-secular world where religion has made a surprising comeback, falsifying 
Weberian predictions of ever-continuing secularization.1 Almost every large society—some 
for the first time in recent history—is grappling with religious pluralism. At the same time, 
however, religious conflicts and religious terrorism occupy newspaper headlines, Islamophobia 
has become rampant,2 anti-Semitism has increased, and lower-scale religious hostility is rife.  
Even majority religions now view themselves as victims of secularization, multiculturalism, 
and the feminist and gay rights ‘agendas’. The re-emergence of religion has resulted in at least 
some of these issues being debated in courts, using the legally prescribed discourse of human 
rights. Here, we most commonly see this debate through the right to religious freedom or the 
right against religious discrimination.  
This article is an intervention in an ongoing debate around the legal protection for religion. 
Some argue that the prohibition on religious discrimination has become a tool to protect 
prejudice and intolerance (usually against women, gays, bisexuals, lesbians and transpersons), 
and therefore religion should lose its status as a protected characteristic altogether.3 By 
contrast, others argue that discrimination law is not taking conscience-based claims of religious 
adherents seriously enough and, in its zeal to protect gay people from discrimination, is itself 
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3 Aileen McColgan, Class Wars? Religion and (In)equality in the Workplace, 38 INDUS. L. J. 1 (2009). 
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discriminating against religious people, alongside violating their religious freedom.4 As such, 
this argument goes, human rights protection of religion is becoming increasingly toothless. It 
seems that neither side is happy with how the law deals with religion.  
This paper approaches the debate around law and religion from a different angle by arguing 
that, while they are often conflated, the right to freedom of religion and the right against 
religious discrimination are in fact distinct human rights. As such, they protect distinct human 
interests and distinct (although often overlapping) aspects of religion. Religious freedom is 
best understood as protecting our interest in religious (non)adherence. The right against 
religious discrimination is best understood as protecting our interest in the unsaddled 
membership of our religious group.5 One right is interested in protecting certain beliefs and 
practices, the other in protecting our tribe. The distinction is well-captured in the old joke about 
a Belfast rabbi being asked if he was ‘a Protestant Jew or a Catholic Jew’. Or, as Ashis Nandy 
claimed in the Indian context, ‘Hindutva will be the end of Hinduism’.6 In these examples, 
Protestantism/Catholicism/Hindutva identify socio-political group identities, whereas Judaism 
and Hinduism concern religious adherence. And yet, legal scholarship has paid little attention 
to this distinction or to its implications.7 This paper sets out the distinction between the two 
sets of interests and their corresponding rights in conceptually clear terms, outlines the 
normative and doctrinal implications that follow, and warns against the normative and practical 
dangers of confusing the two sets of rights and interests. 
Section 2 identifies and explains these two distinct religious interests. These interests may be 
distinguished by adopting different perspectives: religion as viewed from the committed 
perspective of the (non)adherent on the one hand and, on the other hand, the privileges and 
disadvantages that accompany the membership of a religious group as assessed from the non-
committal (public) point of view. This distinction is important for two reasons. First, unpacking 
the differing facets of religious interests provides theoretical clarification—what is the law 
protecting when it protects religion? Secondly, the distinction has practical implications for 
how religious interests are protected. Section 3 identifies a key conceptual distinction between 
the two religious interests distinguished in the preceding section: religious adherence tracks the 
freedom to pursue the good, whereas unsaddled membership of a religious group directly tracks 
the good. In Section 4, we argue that the right to religious freedom is best understood as 
protecting our interest in religious (non)adherence, whereas the right against religious 
discrimination is best understood as protecting religious group membership. We further argue 
that the value of respecting decisional autonomy in matters of religious adherence underpins 
religious freedom, whereas the need to reduce the socio-cultural and material advantage gaps 
between different religious groups is the key aim of the right against religious discrimination.  
This distinction between religious adherence and religious group membership can help explain 
why it is not inconsistent for a person to disapprove of a religious group being made a target 
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of prejudice, stereotypes and social disadvantage, while at the same time rejecting or even 
condemning, some of the substantive religious beliefs of some such groups. It also explains 
why an uncommitted/non-adherent person can and should still receive antidiscrimination law’s 
protection. The conceptual distinction we are proposing may not always be observed in the 
practice of a given jurisdiction. Lawyers often have strategic reasons to throw whatever 
argument might stick, and conceptual tidiness is often a casualty. It would be naive to expect 
theory and practice to mirror each other. Nonetheless, the conceptual (and normative) claims 
in this paper should be a useful guide to understanding the two rights that concern religion.  
Finally, Section 5 highlights key practical implications of this distinction. In particular, we 
discuss the differences between the scope of the two rights, the possibility of their horizontal 
application, difference in attitude to non-zero-sum benefits, and areas of overlap and distinction 
between the two rights. We argue that the scope of religious freedom is extremely broad, 
whereas that of religious antidiscrimination is relatively narrow. On the other hand, there are 
good reasons why religious freedom should be restricted as a claim solely against the state, 
whereas a claim of religious discrimination may be permitted against certain non-state actors 
as well. We demonstrate that certain forms of religious establishment, and other non-zero-sum 
benefits to particular religious groups, breach the antidiscrimination guarantee but not the 
religious freedom guarantee. Finally, we map the areas of overlap between the two rights, and 
identify cases where one of these rights is engaged but not the other. 
2. Two Distinct Religious Interests, from the Committed and Non-Committal 
Perspectives 
In this section, we identify two distinct interests we have with respect to religion: an interest in 
religious (non)adherence and an interest in our ability to enjoy unsaddled membership of a 
religious group. To explore this distinction further, we distinguish the committed perspective 
of the religious (non)adherent from the non-committal (public) identification of the privileges 
and disadvantages—social, economic, cultural and political—that accompany the membership 
of (different) religious groups. The distinction grounds subsequent discussion about the nature 
of the two human rights concerning religion.  
A word first about what is meant by religion. Religion is a complex and multifaceted 
intersubjective phenomenon, in the sense that its existence depends on its shared acceptance in 
the consciousness of several persons. Not all details of its contents need to be shared, but as a 
‘social form’,8 it cannot exist outside of some shared consciousness within a social group. Other 
similar intersubjective phenomena include marriage (it will be meaningless to ‘marry’ someone 
in a society where it did not exist as a social form), money (few would trade valuable goods 
for pieces of paper without an intersubjective acceptance of the value of these pieces of paper) 
and nations (imagined communities they might be,9 but a nation cannot be constituted in the 
imagination of one person—or, even ten, for that matter). This intersubjectivity requirement 
qualifies the committed perspective we are about to explore—it places constraints on what can 
count as religion, and more importantly what cannot (for example, my personal cult of bunny 
                                                   
8 JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 308–310 (1986). Raz understands social forms to be ‘forms of 
behaviour which are…widely practised in society’ or ‘common social forms of action’. Social forms have ‘internal 
richness and complexity’ and the degree to which a practice has to be shared, and by whom, are open questions. 
Raz is clear, however, that comprehensive personal goals—such as, on our argument, religious (non)adherence—
can only be founded in social forms. We assume, without argument, that atheism is a social form in most 
contemporary societies, although this is likely to be the case for many societies in the past too. 
9 BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 
(1983). 
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worship is not likely to satisfy the intersubjectivity requirement).10 Intersubjectivity, of course, 
admits to degrees—perhaps the traditional distinction between a religion and a cult (sans its 
more recent negative connotations) was based on the notion that cults are putative religions 
that do not (yet) satisfy the intersubjectivity threshold.  
Beyond this, it is notoriously difficult, and potentially problematic, to define religion.11 We 
will not attempt to do what our betters have been unable to do. Instead, we will satisfy ourselves 
with identifying the two distinct interests that people have in matters concerning religion: an 
interest in religious (non)adherence and an interest in the unsaddled membership of a religious 
group. 
2.1. The Committed Interest in Religious (Non)Adherence  
The committed or internal point of view is the point of view of the religious adherent. An 
adherent strives to believe in (what she thinks are) the tenets of her religion, and tries to practise 
(what in her view) it demands of her. From the committed perspective, in other words, religious 
adherence involves a commitment to some combination of a set of beliefs and practices. Our 
interest here is to briefly describe the phenomenon of religious adherence (and non-adherence) 
as it actually exists in most democracies. This must be the starting point of any account that 
seeks to understand the nature of our interest in religious (non)adherence. As such, we 
deliberately privilege this descriptive account of the committed adherent’s perspective over 
any official doctrinal perspective of an authoritative religious body. In religions that have 
authoritative bodies—such as hierarchical churches—the official perspective of these bodies 
may well be reflected in that of many of its adherents. But adopting the official doctrinal 
perspective would be contrary to our goal of drawing up a capacious picture of religious 
(non)adherence that reflects the diversity between, and within, religions.12 
Before we proceed, two points on the prefix ‘non’ before ‘adherents’. First, non-adhering belief 
and practice are important not only to atheists and agnostics, but to all religious adherents. This 
is because adherents of a given religious tradition usually do so exclusively. In other words, 
their adherence to religion X often entails a rejection of all other religions, including (say) Y. 
Non-adherence is not restricted to matters of belief. Sometimes it demands performative non-
participation in rituals or worship of other religions. Therefore, to take the committed 
perspective seriously we must recognize that for the adherent of X, it may be important (for 
her adherence to X) not to believe in, or perform acts that are based on, the tenets of religion 
Y. For example, it may be important for an atheist or Jewish witness not to swear on the 
Christian Bible. Even in cases where the demands of another’s religion entail an omission 
rather than an action—for example, non-Hindus required to refrain from eating beef—an 
interest in religious non-adherence is engaged if the prohibition on beef-eating was premised 
on the Hindu injunction to treat the cow as sacred. In other words, all of us have an interest in 
religious non-adherence, whether we choose to assert it or not. More importantly, perhaps, non-
                                                   
10 Maclure and Taylor, among others, also distinguish between ‘religious beliefs’ and ‘expensive tastes’, but on 
criteria other than intersubjectivity: see JOCELYN MACLURE & CHARLES TAYLOR, SECULARISM AND FREEDOM OF 
CONSCIENCE 76 (2011). 
11 See George C. Freeman, III, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of “Religion”, 71 GEO. 
L.J. 1519 (1983). See also CAROLYN EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 51 (2001); Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. REV. 753 
(1984); R (Williamson) v. Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2005] 2 AC 246 (HL) at [57]–[58].  
12 See Volkhard Krech et al., Religious Diversity and Religious Vitality: New Measuring Strategies and Empirical 
Evidence, 9 INTERDISC. J. OF RES. ON RELIGION 2 (2013); Lars Ahlin et al., Religious Diversity and Pluralism: 
Empirical Data and Theoretical Reflections from the Danish Pluralism Project, 27 J. OF CONTEMP. RELIGION 
403–418 (2012); Detlef Pollack, Religious Pluralism: Undermining or Reinforcing Religiosity?, 53 SOCIETY 131–
136 (2016). 
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adherence can, and usually does, arise out of religious commitment to the extent that adherence 
(to religion X) usually entails non-adherence (to religion Y).  
The second point regarding non-adherence is that the line between the religious and the atheist 
is often drawn too sharply. In reality, not only are some religions atheistic (e.g. Jainism) or 
agnostic (e.g. some versions of Buddhism), others include the acceptance as well as the 
rejection of the divine within their ambit (e.g. Hinduism).13 Given the numerous ways in which 
religiosity manifests itself (consider, for example, those atheists who describe themselves as 
‘spiritual’), sharp divisions between atheism and religiosity may capture the reality for some 
people, but unlikely to do so for everyone.14 For these reasons, our interest in religious 
adherence must be understood to include an interest in non-adherence (jointly referred to as 
(non)adherence). 
We can now turn to the first dimension of religious (non)adherence. The dimension of belief, 
or as the European Court of Human Rights prefers to call it, the forum internum, entails (not) 
subscribing to certain fundamental beliefs (usually, but not necessarily) concerning the nature, 
origin and character of life, especially focussing on the human condition and usually entailing 
views about improving it. This can include metaphysical views on life, pre-life, afterlife, and 
future lives, and the nature and existence of superhuman or non-human beings or powers as 
well as human ancestors. This is broadly consistent with what the UK Supreme Court recently 
referred to as ‘mankind’s place in the universe and relationship with the infinite … [which] 
may or may not involve belief in a supreme being.’15 Characterizing this dimension of religion 
broadly in terms of ‘belief’, rather than narrowly as ‘faith’, allows religious traditions that 
invite belief without demanding faith to be included in the concept. It also encompasses those 
beliefs concerning god(s) and religion that are indifferent to, or even reject, faith or god 
(including versions of Buddhism, Jainism, atheism and agnosticism). 
Given this characterization of belief, one objection to our account of the committed perspective 
on religion might be that it is unrealistic, or, at least, not true for many adherents. The term 
‘belief’ can be read to overplay the thoughtfulness, consideration and intensity that go into 
religious adherence. Many people simply (one may say, unthinkingly) follow the (non)religion 
of their parents.16 Many others have a relaxed rather than intense, and flexible rather than 
dogmatic, approach to religious (non)adherence. Given our commitment to imbuing our 
conception of religious (non)adherence with the capaciousness that exists in practice, it would 
be odd if it included only the intense, inflexible, thoughtful or single-minded (non)adherent.17 
While our characterization of belief may not hold true for everyone, we take the seriousness 
and thoughtfulness that go into religious belief as a potentiality—realized to different degrees 
by different (non)adherents. 
This potential for seriousness and thoughtfulness exists in those who reject religious adherence 
as much as in those who accept it. Some Christians rarely think about their Christianity, others 
arrive at it through deep contemplation, after rejecting the alternatives. Similarly, for some 
atheists, their atheism is merely a default (absence of) belief. For others, on the other hand, 
                                                   
13 See generally Linda Woodhead, Intensified Religious Pluralism and De-differentiation: The British Example, 
53 SOCIETY 41 (2016). See also AMARTYA SEN, THE ARGUMENTATIVE INDIAN: WRITINGS ON INDIAN HISTORY, 
CULTURE AND IDENTITY 46 (2006) (Sen’s recollection of a conversation with his grandfather, who identified the 
former’s atheism as falling in the ‘Lokayata part of the Hindu spectrum’). 
14 See RONALD DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD (2013). 
15 R (Hodkin) v. Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2013] UKSC 77 [57], [2014] AC 610 [57]. 
16 See Farrah Ahmed, The Autonomy Rationale for Religious Freedom, 80 MOD. L. REV. 238 (2017). 
17 On a sociological index used to measure intensity of religiosity in persons, see Stefan Huber & Odilo Huber, 
The Centrality of Religiosity Scale, 3 RELIGIONS 710–724 (2012). 
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rejection of all (or some) religions is a deeply considered, strongly held, metaphysical and 
ethical belief fundamental to their individuality—some atheists are quite devout in their 
unbelief. The point is this: in the dimension of belief, religions make claims which have truth 
value (i.e. they are the sort of claims that may be true or false, or be true to some extent). This 
is why adherents are able to accept these claims are true.18 Accepting or rejecting these claims 
can both be thoughtful or thoughtless, salient or unimportant, intense or relaxed.  
Despite these objections, we defend this capacious conception of religious belief, which adopts 
the committed (but not necessarily dogmatic) perspective of the adherent, because it most truly 
reflects the diversity of religious belief that exists. 
The second dimension of religion, from the adherent’s viewpoint, is its practical or 
performative side—its forum externum. This usually entails rules of behavior and performative 
practices such as worship, prayer, sacrifice, rituals, and meditation. The scope and 
demandingness of religious practice varies from religion to religion. Some religions also 
require that at least some of these practices and rituals must be undertaken in community with 
other adherents. Indeed, some practices and rituals can only take place where there is a religious 
community.19 Thus, the committed viewpoint often has a communal dimension. Some practical 
dimensions of religion follow from beliefs, often called manifestations of beliefs in European 
law, and provide reasons for action. But not all religious practice and performance can be 
characterized as manifestations of beliefs. Some religions (like Protestantism) emphasise 
beliefs, others (such as Buddhism and Orthodox Judaism) focus on practice, most on some 
combination of the two.20  
We have seen how religious commitment is diverse. When we take the diversity of religious 
commitment seriously, we notice that most adherents subscribe to a web of multiple, but 
usually interrelated, beliefs and practices. Viewed from this committed perspective, the level 
of religious diversity one finds around the world is astonishing. Some religions seek coherence 
in their package of beliefs and practices. Others, like Hinduism, are happier to embrace 
mutually contradictory beliefs and practices. Even when not directly contradictory, there is 
significant interpretive latitude around religious demands on adherents.21 Even in religions with 
internal structures that make authoritative rulings on doctrinal disagreements, adherents often 
pick and choose from the packages on offer—the diversity of beliefs among Catholics on the 
legitimacy of same-sex marriages and abortion is a case in point.22 Indeed, a recent sociological 
study of ‘Catholics’ in the UK shows that ‘if we measure Catholics by their conformity to some 
of the key beliefs and behaviors laid down by the Catholic magisterium … only 5% of Catholics 
qualify as “faithful” or orthodox’.23 Further still, adherents are often capable of giving varying 
weights and emphases to different religious demands, making the actual practice of religion 
                                                   
18 See PAUL HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE: LAW, RELIGION, AND THE CONSTITUTION 153–4 (2011). 
19 See Farrah Ahmed & Jane Calderwood Norton, Religious Tribunals, Religious Freedom, and Concern for 
Vulnerable Woman, 24 CHILD & FAM. L. Q. 363, 377–378 (2012). 
20 It is for this reason that we use the capacious term ‘adherent’ rather than the narrower term ‘believer’ to describe 
a person committed to a religion. 
21 This is why talk of Catholicisms, Islams and Judaisms makes sense: Peter W. Edge, Determining Religion in 
English Courts, 1 OXF. J. OF L. AND RELIGION 402, at 402, 406 (2012); FARRAH AHMED, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
UNDER THE PERSONAL LAW SYSTEM 19–21 (2016). 
22  Ayelet Shachar discusses this selectivity—or ‘forum shopping’—between state and religious institutions in the 
context of family law disputes: see AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES 
AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS 122–126 (2001). John Bowen observed similar selectivity in relation to shari’a law in 
England: John Bowden, Private Arrangements "Recognizing Sharia" in England, BOSTON REVIEW (March/April 
2009), www.http://bostonreview.net/BR34.2/bowen.php. 
23 Woodhead, supra note 13, at 42. 
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staggeringly pluralistic. As the history of religious conflicts has shown, these differences could 
be over relatively small, and—for non-adherents and even some adherents of the same 
religion—inconsequential matters. 
The committed interest in religious (non)adherence is expansive. It presents a picture of 
religious (non)adherence that is diverse and pluralistic (both within and between religions). 
This diversity exists in the dimensions of belief and practice. Religious commitment demands 
adherence as well as non-adherence from us. These expansive takes on our interest in 
(non)adherence are tempered, however, by the requirement of intersubjectivity. 
Intersubjectivity filters out highly eccentric and frivolous beliefs or practices. As such, the 
committed perspective avoids three potential pitfalls when defining the scope of the interest in 
religious (non)adherence: (i) over-inclusion that leads to the protection of just about any 
ideology, belief or practice, (ii) under-inclusion of dissenting, minority, and heterodox 
religions, and (iii) exclusion of atheism and agnosticism.24 These findings are central to how 
we understand the right to freedom of religion, and the values that underpin it. 
2.2. The Non-Committal Interest in Unsaddled Membership of a Religious Group 
Having considered religion from the committed perspective of the adherent, we now consider 
the phenomenon from a different angle by adopting an external or public perspective. This can 
be termed the non-committal perspective. From the non-committal, or public, perspective, we 
focus not on adherents of certain religions but on members of certain religious groups.  
Group membership can affect how power and advantage are distributed in society. In most 
human societies, power and advantage—material, socio-cultural, political—are distributed in 
ways are that sensitive to certain personal characteristics (such as race, educational attainment, 
or gender) but insensitive to other personal characteristics (such as zodiac signs, the number of 
letters in one’s name, or one’s favourite colour).25 Individual exceptions no doubt abound, but 
on a macro-level, these claims are generally accepted as true of many contemporary societies. 
Religious group membership, in most societies, tends to fall in the former category, inasmuch 
as it tends to affect the success of our lives (at least in the material world). Here, it does not 
matter whether a person actually adheres to the beliefs or practices of any particular religion. 
She is more likely than not to have the powers and advantages (or lack thereof) in keeping with 
others who are, or are perceived to be, the members of the same religious group. She may 
belong to (or be perceived to belong to) a religious group, even without being an adherent. This 
(assumption of) membership may be because of the religious group membership of her parents, 
or because religious practice has become a familiar part of her cultural habits, or because she 
carries proxy characteristics (such as belonging to certain racial or ethnic groups) that signify 
(to others) adherence to a particular religion. She may even take pride in her membership of 
her religious group and find community and solace in  fellow members despite not being an 
adherent, or she may dislike it, or be indifferent to it. Just like her membership of her caste or 
racial group, how she feels about it makes little difference to her actual or perceived religious 
group membership, just as her adherence or lack thereof makes no difference either. Like it or 
not, she is likely to be saddled with (or enjoy the privileges of) the (dis)advantages that 
accompany her membership of her religious group. 
In most cases adherents are likely to be members of a religious group. However, the two 
categories do not entirely map onto each other. For example, recent converts may have cultural 
and ethnic traits that differ from most adherents. There are people who identify as ‘cultural 
                                                   
24 Andrew Koppelman, How Could Religious Liberty Be a Human Right? INT’L J. OF CONST. LAW (forthcoming), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2995605##. 
25 See TARUNABH KHAITAN, A THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION LAW, ch. 2–3 (2015). 
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Christians’ or ‘atheistic Jews’ having given up on adherence but not on the associated cultural 
traits. Heterodox and dissenting interpreters of a tradition—such as Reform Jews and 
Ahmadis—may be saddled with the cultural identification of majority adherents by the outside 
world but seen as non-members, or even heretics, by their ‘co-religionists’. It is not uncommon 
for Sikhs in North America and elsewhere to be taken to be Muslims because of racial and 
cultural similarities. These examples illustrate that (non)membership of a religious group is not 
always within the control of the individual.  
The non-committal perspective takes seriously the fact that religious group membership often 
gets mixed up with culture, ethnicity, race, language, and nationalism. Not only is the 
(non)membership of her religious group not fully within the control of the individual adherent, 
she usually has even less control over the socio-political and material disabilities (or privileges) 
that accompany such membership. What is more, even for a typical religious adherent who 
fully embraces her actual and perceived religious group membership, her interest in being able 
to adhere truly to her religion is related to, but surely distinct from, her interest in her religious 
group not being subject to social, cultural, material or political disabilities. 
Implicit in the preceding paragraphs is a very specific conception of a ‘group’. The term is not 
necessarily used to refer to a cohesive collectivity with a shared 
culture/language/history/religion/identity etc.26 We have used the term ‘group’ more loosely. 
It includes people who perceive themselves to be members of the group even when the group 
does not and those who are taken to be the members of the group when they do not see 
themselves as such. There need not be any cohesiveness to this ‘group’. On our understanding, 
‘people with disabilities’, heterosexuals, and yes, even atheists, qualify as a group. Having said 
that, given the non-committal perspective we have assumed, there needs to be some external, 
sociological, reality to the group, outside of the internal point of view of its members.27 
We have identified two interests pertaining to religion: the committed interest in religious (non) 
adherence and the non-committal interest in unsaddled membership of a religious group. These 
interests, we argue, are distinct. By way of illustration, a ‘Muslim’ woman, living in a deprived, 
predominantly Muslim, neighbourhood in Birmingham (or Delhi, for that matter) suffers 
because of such deprivation, whether or not she if fact adheres to any version of Islam. On the 
other hand, being forbidden from wearing a crucifix at work might engage a devout Christian’s 
interest in religious adherence, but does not—in itself—affect his membership of his religious 
group (understood in the loose sense as explained above). We now turn to a key conceptual 
difference between these interests. 
3. A Conceptual Distinction between the Two Interests 
We have identified two distinct interests a person might have with respect to religion: (i) an 
interest in her ability to (intersubjectively) determine and to pursue her religious commitments 
as a (non)adherent, and (ii) an interest in being unsaddled by the disabilities that accompany 
her religious group membership. Religion is not unique in possessing these two dimensions. 
Pregnancy, for example, has an internal dimension concerning a person’s decision (as well as 
her ability to decide whether) to become (or not become) pregnant. From the non-committal 
perspective, on the other hand, pregnancy (and the ability or potential to become pregnant) 
brings with it certain social and economic costs, such as reduced attractiveness in the 
employment market, the stigma attached to pregnancy outside marriage, the medical and care 
                                                   
26 On this type of religious ‘group’, see Renate Ysseldyk et al., Religiosity as Identity: Toward an Understanding 
of Religion From a Social Identity Perspective, 14 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 60, 60–71 (2010). 
27 See infra Section 5.1 Scope of the Rights (discussion towards the end of the section). 
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costs associated with pregnancy and so on. Sexual orientation has a similar quality. From the 
internal point of view, what matters is a person’s orientation with respect to the sex and gender 
of the person they are sexually or romantically attracted to, and their decision (as well as their 
ability to decide whether) to associate sexually and/or romantically with a person of the same 
sex as their own. Societally, this could have been completely irrelevant to the distribution of 
social, cultural, political and material power between gay people and heterosexuals; 
unfortunately, as we know, this is not the case. 
Defenders of pregnancy and sexual orientation rights have questioned whether privacy or 
antidiscrimination is a better approach to defend these rights.28 These debates have taken place 
precisely because both approaches have something to offer to the protection of the interests 
involved. In this section, we draw upon these continuities to clarify a key conceptual distinction 
between the two categories of religious interests identified in the previous section. Unlike the 
debates that have taken place in the context of pregnancy and sexual orientation, however, we 
will show that these are not alternative ways of framing the same human interest, rather that 
they are two distinct interests that we ought to treat separately. 
We draw a conceptual distinction between two sets of human interests: our interests in the 
good, and our interests in our freedom to pursue the good. In the first set, we have interests 
whose satisfaction is, at least prima facie, necessarily a good thing (from a public, objective, 
perspective). It may not be possible to always protect such interests all things considered, and 
some such compromises may be entirely legitimate. But on their own, the satisfaction of these 
interests is always a good thing. Such interests include our interest in adequate nutrition, good 
education, fair trial, protective shelter, and so on. In all these cases, the good is tracked directly 
by the satisfaction of the interest concerned.  
On the other hand, we have interests not only in realizing the good, but also (or, even 
especially) in pursuing the good on our own. In these cases, it is in our interest to freely define 
the good and to pursue it, even when we might sometimes make mistakes.29 Examples include 
our interest in freely choosing who to become friends with, whether and who to marry, what 
and how to say something, what career to pursue, whether and what films to watch or books to 
read and so on. While, generally speaking, being free to pursue the good in such cases is a good 
thing, there is the possibility of making mistakes. Making friends with bullies, saying hurtful 
things simply to hurt others, or joining a racist organisation do not become good simply because 
these acts were freely done. For this reason, the distinction between interests that directly track 
the good and those that track my interest in the freedom to define and to pursue the good makes 
sense.30 We do not, lest we are misunderstood, wish to suggest that our interests in the good 
are necessarily superior to our interests in our freedom to pursue the good. They are, 
nonetheless, conceptually different, and this difference could be normatively salient. 
Now we can map this distinction onto the two interests we have identified. It is always a good 
thing that one’s religious group is not saddled with relative social, political and material 
disabilities. This is just a roundabout way of saying that social disabilities should not, in an 
ideal world, accompany religious group membership. On the other hand, our interest in 
                                                   
28 See the Yoshino-Gerken debate: Heather Gerken, Larry and Lawrence, 42 TULSA L. REV. 843 (2008);  Kenji 
Yoshino, Tribe, 42 TULSA L. REV 961 (2008). See also David Richards, Liberal Democracy and the Problems of 
Patriarchy, 46 ISRAEL L. REV. 169 (2013). 
29 Analogous to these interests are the rights that include the ‘right to do wrong’: see Jeremy Waldron, A Right to 
Do Wrong, 92 ETHICS 21 (1981). 
30 Posner draws a similar distinction between intermediate/instrumental goods on the one hand and final/ultimate 
goods on the other: see Richard Posner, The Right to Privacy, 12 GEORGIA L. REV. 393, 394 (1977). 
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religious adherence tracks our freedom to pursue the good in matters religious. The 
intersubjectively determined committed viewpoint is not, after all, subject to any public 
standard of reasonableness or morality, and may therefore make demands that are unreasonable 
or immoral. This key conceptual distinction underpins some of the normative judgments that 
need to be made in relation to the protection of these interests, especially in relation to their 
operation in horizontal relations between non-state actors.  
4. The Right to Freedom of Religion and the Right Against Religious Discrimination 
Our starting point is that if most human rights documents recognize two distinct human rights 
pertaining to religion—the right to freedom of religion and the right against religious non-
discrimination—they are best understood as protecting distinct religious interests. The claim is 
conceptual and normative, rather than historical. Even if their distinct articulation is a historical 
accident, or even technical oversight on the part of the drafters, the conceptual claim would 
still be plausible in light of the distinctiveness of the two religious interests we identified in 
Section 2. Having identified these distinct interests, we will now argue that our interest in 
religious adherence is best protected under the right to freedom of religion, and we are most 
likely to enjoy unsaddled religious group membership under a robust right against religious 
discrimination.  
The main reason for this claim is that there are structural similarities between the interests 
identified in Section 2 and the jurisprudence concerning the two rights (at least in Europe). 
While there are other ways of reading legal doctrine concerning these rights, we offer a 
normative restatement of these rights by selecting those strands in the jurisprudence that do the 
best job of protecting the two religious interests at stake. Thus, the interest and the right 
mutually define each other. We will argue that freedom of religion is valuable because it 
protects our decisional autonomy in matters of religious adherence. Freedom from 
discrimination based on certain protected characteristics matters morally because the 
possession of these characteristics tends to affect our access to those basic goods necessary for 
living a good life.  
4.1 The Right to Freedom of Religion 
Freedom of religion is valuable because it protects our decisional autonomy in matters of 
religious adherence. Many other foundational values are also plausible,  including the value of 
social goods such as religious tolerance, religious pluralism and social harmony, and the value 
in respecting an individual’s conscience or integrity. We do not deny that these values may 
also be good reasons to support some version of religious freedom. However, the only value 
that can fully support the capacious version of our interest in religious (non)adherence (as 
understood in Section 2) is the need to respect our decisional autonomy in matters pertaining 
to religious adherence. 
Religious pluralism, harmony and tolerance are no doubt valuable social goods, but they fail 
to directly underpin an individual’s interest in religious (non)adherence (even though many 
may indirectly facilitate its protection in most circumstances). The historical origins of the 
protection of religious freedom may well lie in these social goods.31 Since its transformation 
into a contemporary human right, however, its underlying rationale must, at least primarily, be 
found in a fundamental human interest, rather than in the common good.32 
                                                   
31 See Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. OF CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 317 (1996). 
32 R (Williamson) v. Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2005] 2 AC 246 (HL) at [22] (freedom 
of religion protects the subjective belief of an individual). 
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The need to respect an individual’s conscience is a more promising candidate. In fact, some 
scholars believe that religion is merely a placeholder for the protection of ‘conscience’ in 
human rights law.33 While there might be very good reasons to protect conscience for its own 
sake, our account of religious adherence from the committed viewpoint shows that religion is 
both broader and narrower than conscience. Not all religious beliefs implicate one’s 
conscience, which is typically other-regarding rather than self-regarding. For example, most 
people would accept that the religious obligations of Muslims to pray five times a day or make 
a pilgrimage are not matters of conscience. A belief that does not engage one’s conscience may 
nonetheless be fundamentally important to the believer because it is demanded by his or her 
religion. On the other hand, not all conscientious beliefs are ‘religious’. While many systemic 
and comprehensive worldviews, such as pacifism and environmentalism, could be sufficiently 
religion-like for certain purposes (and should perhaps be treated as such by human rights law), 
one’s conscience can also make standalone demands against military service or eating animal 
products that do not flow from an existing commitment to any broader worldview or involve 
intersubjectivity. For these reasons, the value of respecting an individual’s conscience cannot 
ground the right to religious freedom. 
Personal integrity is also insufficient to ground the right to religious freedom. This value takes 
an individual’s relationship to herself seriously, and facilitates a harmonious and complete 
conception of one’s self. It is related to conscience, but can encompass not only ethical, but 
also performative and ritualistic (e.g. prayer and pilgrimage) dimensions of religious 
adherence. Like conscience, its scope is broader than religious adherence. However, over-
inclusion is less of a problem as long as we can carve out a clear subset of the value that 
concerns religion. We reject integrity as the foundational value of religious freedom not 
because it is over-inclusive, but because it is also under-inclusive—it does not include our 
capacious conception of a person’s possible interests in religious adherence. Integrity tends to 
overvalue adherence that is intense, thought-through and deeply held, and may fail to 
adequately protect religiosity that is relaxed, flexible, or habitual. Like conscience, it also has 
the tendency to cast religion in a particularly Protestant image (‘Here I stand, I can do no 
other’), and may underserve other strands of religious (non)adherence. 
The value of respecting every person’s decisional autonomy in matters of religious adherence 
is the most viable norm to underpin religious freedom. An autonomy-based rationale demands 
respect for a committed point of view in a way that other rationales may not. For example, a 
social harmony based protection for religious freedom might be content to protect only the 
essential practices of major religions, interference in which might cause conflict.34 The 
autonomy rationale, on the other hand, is acutely sensitive to the religious pluralism and 
diversity we see in religious practice, including sensitivity to internal diversity within religions. 
It extends its protection to heterodox and dissenting views and to non-religious persons. One 
of us has argued elsewhere in some detail why the value of preserving our decisional autonomy 
in matters of religious adherence is also normatively attractive for other reasons.35 The 
underlying premises are that personal autonomy is of immense value to individuals, that in 
order to be autonomous individuals must have access to a range of valuable opportunities, and 
that the freedom to make decisions in relation to (non)adherence to religions is one such 
valuable opportunity.36  
                                                   
33 Michael Sandel, Religious Liberty - Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice?, 3 UTAH L. REV. 597 
(1989). 
34 The Indian Supreme Court tends to adopt this position. 
35 JANE CALDERWOOD NORTON, FREEDOM OF RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS (2016). 
36 On personal autonomy generally, see Raz, supra note 8. 
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An autonomy-based rationale has the additional advantage of protecting our capacious interest 
in religious adherence: it is not under-inclusive, nor unfair to non-believers. It also has 
significant support in case law37 and academic literature.38 It is, of course, over-inclusive, 
inasmuch as decisional autonomy in matters of religious adherence is a subset of our decisional 
autonomy generally. Even so, decisional autonomy in matters pertaining to religious 
(non)adherence is a clearly identifiable subset that protects a fundamental and valuable 
interest.  
We do not claim that religion is the only, or the most valuable, subset of decisional autonomy. 
Other facets of decisional autonomy (e.g. in matters of sexual relationships) also need robust 
protection—and as such sidestep the debate over whether religion is special except to express 
scepticism about the possibility.39 This scepticism is conceptual—attempts to define religion 
generally have failed because it is hard (if not impossible) to pin down a set of characteristics 
that pertain to all phenomena we agree to characterize as religions. Any effort to suggest that 
religion is special will necessarily need to highlight some common feature in all religions that 
makes religion special. The best that can be done is to imagine religion in a particular image—
privileging a certain religious tradition and identifying its core features to claim special status. 
But that would be an argument for why Catholicism or Buddhism is special, not why religion 
is special.40 
Two common criticisms of the decisional autonomy rationale must be responded to. The first 
is that religion is often not a matter of choice for its adherents. The second it that the rationale 
is too individualistic. With regards to the first criticism, autonomy is too easily confused with 
a simplistic understanding of ‘choice’.41 When we speak of ‘decisional autonomy’, we do not 
intend to suggest that everyone necessarily has a free choice in matters of religious adherence. 
In fact, many adherents may not feel that they have (or, indeed, that they should have) any 
choice in subscribing to (what they view as) the truth.42 This truth may make many imperative 
demands on them that leave little room for choice.43 Others may have followed the religion of 
                                                   
37 E.g. Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v. Russia, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 4 [134]–[135] (2011); Eweida v. British 
Airways Plc. [2010] EWCA Civ 80 [40]; R (Begum) v. Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15, 
[2007] 1 AC 100 [93]; R (Williamson) v. Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2003] QB 1300 (CA) 
(2003);  Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 (Can.). For US examples, see LAURENCE TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1284–1300 (2000); KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION, 
VOLUME I: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS 3–4 (2006). For a full account see Ahmed, supra note 16. 
38 E.g., EVANS, supra note 11; GREENAWALT, supra note 37, at 3–4. Sandel also accepts that an autonomy-based 
conception of religious freedom is the predominant contemporary liberal understanding of religious freedom: 
Michael J. Sandel,  Religious Liberty—Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice?, UTAH L. REV. 597, 611 
(1989). See also Ahmed,  supra note 16, at 239. 
39 We take this to be asking whether religious interests are special—and weightier—than non-religious ones. 
40 See generally, Koppelman, supra note 24; Andrew Koppelman, Is It Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment?, 
U. ILL. L. REV. 571 (2006); Christopher Eisgruber & Lawrence Sager, Does it Matter What Religion Is?, 84 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 807 (2009); Micah Schwartzman, What if Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351 (2012); 
BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2012); Michael McConnell, Why Protect Religious Freedom?, 123 
YALE L.J. 770 (2013). 
41 The choice-based understanding of religious autonomy is rightly criticised. See RONAN MCCREA, RELIGION 
AND THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 111 (2010). Similar criticisms apply to arguments from choice 
in the context of reproductive rights. See Thérèse Murphy, The Texture of Reproductive Technologies, in NEW 
TECHNOLOGOIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Thérèse Murphy ed., 2009). 
42 See Sandel, supra note 38, at 611; John Garvey, Free Exercise and the Value of Religious Liberty, 18 CONN. L. 
REV. 779, 791 (1986). 
43 See Nicholas Aroney, Individual, Community and State: Thoughts on Jane Norton, Freedom of Religious 
Organizations, AUSTL. J. OF LEGAL PHIL. (forthcoming 2018). 
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their parents with little thought and without ever consciously exercising any choice. Later in 
life, it may be psychologically very difficult for them to choose not to follow that religion.44  
While we accept that an adherent may not feel they have choice in religious matters, we are 
employing a capacious conception of autonomy. This conception seeks to protect the agent’s 
moral capacity to make her own decisions on matters concerning religious (non)adherence, 
whether or not she feels she has (or in fact has) any ‘choice’ in the matter and whether or not 
this moral capacity is ever acted upon. It protects the religious freedom of converts who 
actively change their religious status, of those who zealously reaffirm it, as well as those who 
never care to think much about it. This broad notion of decisional autonomy does not seek to 
relegate religious adherence to the private sphere either—it accepts that religious performance 
can and does have a public dimension. Nor does it reject communal dimensions of religious 
adherence—if communal performance matters to the adherent, it forms part of her decisional 
autonomy in religious matters. 
Furthermore, the term ‘autonomy’ is used here to mean an aspirational value that ought to be 
sought and realized, rather than implying any descriptive claim about our actually possessing 
autonomy.45 Of course some of us, in the descriptive sense, have more autonomy than others, 
and many don’t have adequate autonomy. In the case of religion, it is no coincidence that most 
people adhere to the religions of their parents. Even so, there are good reasons for the state to 
take an adherent’s self-proclaimed religious affiliation at face value in the absence of any proof 
of direct coercion, even if such adherence is deluded, irrational, unfairly influenced, and so 
on.46 The autonomy loss resulting from the non-recognition or mis-recognition of one’s self-
proclaimed religion is unlikely to be offset by any autonomy gains accruing from efforts by the 
state to help them ‘see light’. The state telling me my religion might have got it wrong is usually 
better than it telling me I have got my religion wrong. An autonomy-based rationale dictates 
that we take the committed point of view of the adherent seriously. Individual decisional 
autonomy in religious matters would be left with little content if any external body or person 
could determine whether an individual has freely chosen to adhere to a religion, what that 
religion is, what adherence to that religion entails, or who (if anyone) is an authority on what 
an adherence to that religion requires.  
While the autonomy rationale takes the committed perspective of the adherent seriously, the 
rationale itself need not be endorsed as adequate justification for religious freedom from the 
committed point of view. It is not even clear, from the internal point of view of every religion, 
that the protection of (everyone’s) religious freedom is valuable. It is only the content of the 
claim that the adherent seeks protection for that is discerned from the committed point of view; 
the reasons for protecting such claims (whether autonomy, toleration, or something else) need 
not be endorsed by the adherent’s committed viewpoint. Nor is our argument that the law itself 
should adopt a committed viewpoint in matters of religion. We agree with the Rawlsian 
position that the state’s reasons must always and only track public reasons,47 even as public 
reasons sometimes require the state to tolerate, respect or protect actions grounded in sectarian 
reasons. Our argument here is simply that there may be good (public) reasons for the state to 
protect an adherent’s committed internal perspective in matters of religion.  
                                                   
44 See Leslie Green, Rights of Exit, 4 LEGAL THEORY 165 (1998); Susan Moller Okin, “Mistresses of Their Own 
Destiny”: Group Rights, Gender, and Realistic Rights of Exit, 112 ETHICS 205, 216–222 (2002). 
45 See generally Raz, supra note 8. 
46 R (Begum) v. Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15, [2007] 1 AC 100 [95]–[96]. 
47 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1996). 
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The second objection to the decisional autonomy rationale might be that it is too individualistic. 
We acknowledged, however, the importance of communal dimensions of religious practice in 
certain religions in the preceding section. While the rationale values autonomy of individuals, 
it is compatible with—and even requires—the protection of any communal dimension of 
religious adherence.48 This will be the case so long as the collective or communal dimension 
is (intersubjectively as well as from the committed perspective) part of the religion. In other 
words, if communal worship is important to the individual’s adherence to her religion, an 
autonomy-based rationale will protect it. Participation in the life of a religious community, or 
the acceptance of the religious authority of one’s church, can therefore be aspects of religious 
adherence.49 Furthermore, the essence of religious practice itself often depends on social 
forms—i.e. forms of behavior which are widely practiced within that group.50 While it is 
individual believers who constitute a religious community, the group itself may have ‘a strong 
role to play in constructing individual religious affiliation’.51 None of this needs to be denied 
by anyone who subscribes to the autonomy rationale for religious freedom. Any adherent who 
disagrees with such collectivity requirements is simply a dissenter within that group (whose 
right to dissent is equally protected).52 In other words, there surely are collective dimensions 
to freedom of religion, but these are derivative of the individual’s right to that freedom.53 
4.2 The Right against Religious Discrimination 
Unlike the right to freedom of religion, the right against religious discrimination is not a 
standalone guarantee. It is a species of the more general freedom from discrimination based on 
certain protected characteristics which, apart from religion, tend to be race, gender, disability, 
sexual orientation, language, ethnicity and so on. As such, unless we have very good reasons 
to think otherwise, the rationale for prohibiting religious discrimination must be found in the 
rationale for prohibiting discrimination more generally.54  
The main function of the prohibition of discrimination, as one of us has argued before, is to 
prevent, reduce or eliminate any substantial, abiding and pervasive advantage gaps between 
certain cognate groups (i.e. groups defined by the same personal characteristic, such as men 
and women, or Christians and Sikhs).55 These advantage gaps could be political, material, or 
socio-cultural, but usually tend to manifest in all these dimensions simultaneously and 
reinforce each other. The underpinning normative argument is that we should care about such 
advantage gaps between groups because they reduce the ability of members of the (relatively) 
disadvantaged groups to access certain basic goods—negative freedom, an adequate range of 
valuable opportunities, and self-respect—whose secure enjoyment is essential to our ability to 
live a free and flourishing life.56 Thus, even though the object of discrimination law’s 
                                                   
48 See CALDERWOOD NORTON, supra note 35. 
49 Hasan & Chaush v. Bulgaria, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 55 [62] (2002). 
50 See RAZ, supra note 8, at 308. 
51 See CALDERWOOD NORTON, supra note 35, at 24. 
52 See Green, supra note 44. 
53 See CALDERWOOD NORTON, supra note 35. Cf. Julian Rivers, Religious Liberty as a Collective Right, in LAW 
AND RELIGION (Richard O’Dair & Andrew Lewis eds., 2001). 
54 See generally Dworkin on local priority within ‘departments’ of law: RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 250f 
(1986). 
55 See KHAITAN, supra note 25. For comparable accounts see Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 
5 PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS (1976); Cass Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410 
(1994). 
56 On how this happens, see KHAITAN, supra note 25, at ch. 5.  
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immediate attention is groups, in keeping with the contemporary human rights tradition, the 
ultimate commitment is to the freedom and well-being of (all) individuals.57 
One need not accept the details of this rationale for discrimination law. But almost all credible 
accounts of this area of law— at least accounts that take the Anglo-American law concerning 
the regulation of discrimination seriously—accept that the current or historical disadvantage 
faced by social groups lies at the heart of discrimination law. This is true of egalitarian 
accounts,58 freedom-based accounts59 as well as expressive accounts60 that seek to explain 
discrimination law. Given this consensus—at least at a broad level—it would be very surprising 
if the main purpose of the law regulating religious discrimination was to protect individual 
religious (non)adherence (rather than to secure an unsaddled membership of one’s religious 
group). This theoretical consensus over the group focus in discrimination law may seem 
surprising to some practitioners, especially if they notice that typically, the claimants in 
discrimination law are individuals, and that the protection is offered symmetrically to both the 
advantaged and the disadvantaged groups. To answer this objection, we need to distinguish 
this systemic-functional claim about the overall purpose of discrimination law from specific 
design issues. Drawing upon Rawls and Hart, one of us has argued elsewhere that full 
transparency between the functional goal of discrimination law and the design of particular 
rules that regulate discrimination may actually be counterproductive.61 To put the point 
differently, the goal of reducing relative group disadvantage may be ill-served if courts start 
asking in each case what outcome will best reduce such disadvantage. Additional 
considerations of fairness, pragmatism, clarity, certainty, and a normative commitment to 
liberalism also inform the design of antidiscrimination rules. Considerations such as these, for 
example, dictate that (in general) discrimination law should protect not only the relatively 
disadvantaged group but also its cognate advantaged groups.62 
On the reading we have outlined, non-committal religious group membership, rather than 
committed religious adherence, lies at the heart of discrimination law.63 Because religion is 
one of the characteristics that creates substantial, abiding, and pervasive advantage gaps 
between cognate groups, it is a protected characteristic in discrimination law, alongside race, 
sex, sexual orientation, disability, pregnancy, ethnicity, and other characteristics. It follows that 
the big-picture concern of discrimination law is to prevent or mitigate a caste-like organization 
of society on religious lines where certain religious groups end up with a lower class status. 
Burdening adherence to a particular religion may well increase the (political, material, social) 
advantage gap between religious groups, but there are other ways this can happen too. It may 
be, for example, that most members of a minority religion are poor, or that they are recent 
immigrants, or that they are subject to widespread hostility and ostracism by the majority 
religious group because of their racial difference, and therefore suffer relative group 
disadvantage. Discrimination law is indifferent to the cause of such disadvantage. Rather, it is 
the fact or likelihood of relative group disadvantage that this area of law seeks to counter. 
                                                   
57 See KHAITAN, supra note 25, at 38f (on the ‘eccentric distribution condition’ for more clarification on the group 
orientation of discrimination law).  
58 See, e.g., SANDRA FREDMAN, DISCRIMINATION LAW (2002); Catharine MacKinnon, Toward a Renewed Equal 
Rights Amendment: Now More than Ever, 37 HARV. J. OF L. & GENDER 569 (2014). 
59 See, e.g., Sophia Moreau, What is Discrimination?, 38 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. (2010); KHAITAN,  supra note 25. 
60 See, e.g., DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? (2008). 
61 See KHAITAN, supra note 25.  
62 See id. at ch. 6. 
63 Just as the protected characteristic ‘sex’ is akin to the personal characteristic of sex and gender rather than 
sexual intercourse. Of course, group membership and behavior are related, but not reducible to each other.  
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As we move from the systemic concern that discrimination law has with group disadvantage 
to specific design issues, we notice—at least outside the context of religious discrimination—
a rather tightly regulated scope of what counts as discrimination. In the limited contexts that 
discrimination law regulates, a claimant must establish a prima facie case of direct or indirect 
discrimination against her. The determination is objective, and requires the claimant to show 
either that she suffered some non-remote adverse effect: 
(a) because of the defendant’s intentional reliance on a protected characteristic,64 or 
(b) that the defendant’s facially neutral policy had such adverse effect  
i. either exclusively on members of her group,65 or  
ii. on those who disproportionately belong to her group.66  
British law treats (a) and (b)(i) as instances of direct discrimination, and (b)(ii) as a case of 
indirect discrimination. Cases in (a) that involve the intentional targeting of a religious group, 
or even the intentional use of religion in a decision, tend to be rare, and when they come up, 
tend to be easier to decide. It is the set of cases in (b) that are the most controversial and shall 
be our focus in the discussion that follows. These cases involve the impact of a facially neutral 
policy on the claimant’s group. In such group impact cases, discrimination must be established 
by showing comparative adverse effect on the claimant’s group, in relation to a cognate group. 
So, in the case of religion, a claimant must show that the policy in question not only affected 
her but also that it (exclusively or disproportionately) affected other members of her religious 
group when compared with some other cognate group. For example, a Muslim claimant will 
need to show that an employer who requires a university degree for a manual job in an area 
where Muslims are disproportionately less likely to have university degrees affected not just 
her (as a potential applicant who did not meet the criterion) but also disproportionately affected 
Muslims (in that area) generally. 
Whether a protected group suffered adverse impact is determined objectively, rather than 
subjectively. This objective standard sets a relatively high bar for making a prima facie case of 
discrimination. This high bar is unavoidable, to some extent, given that discrimination law’s 
primary concern is with group disadvantage. While the entry threshold is relatively high, 
however, the possibility of justifying a successful prima facie case is relatively slim. Direct 
discrimination admits to very few and very high threshold exceptions. Moreover, even though 
indirect discrimination can be justified, certain types of justifications—such as the business 
profitability, consumer preference or competitive disadvantage—are typically barred. 
Although the claimant has a demanding threshold to cross in order to make a prima facie case 
of discrimination, once she has met this threshold the possibility that the discrimination she 
faces might be justified is slim and usually assessed strictly by courts. 
Religious group membership (chosen or otherwise) saddles us with privileges and disabilities. 
Given this, something would be lost (and very little gained) if the right against religious 
discrimination was reduced to just another means of protecting our interest in religious 
adherence. While there may be good strategic reasons for practicing lawyers to try to achieve 
these outcomes, the erasure of the distinction we are hoping to highlight will not only create 
                                                   
64 British/European law treats this as direct discrimination: Bougnaoui v. Micropole SA (2017) Case C-188/15 
(E.C.J.). Even these cases that track intentional use of a protected characteristic as a basis of classification are 
ultimately concerned with the adverse effect of such use on the protected group. See KHAITAN, supra note 25, at 
ch. 6. 
65 This is also direct discrimination in British/European law. See James v. Eastleigh B.C. [1990] 2 AC 751; Bull 
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conceptual confusion but will ultimately be a bad thing for the protection of our religious 
interests. 
We should emphasise that the sharp distinction we are drawing between the two rationales for 
human rights protection of religious interests—religion as adherence and religion as group 
membership—is a conceptual one. The two religious interests can, after all, overlap. It is 
evidently true that often protection of religious freedom is likely to reduce not just the religious, 
but also social, material, and political disadvantages faced by its adherents. And sometimes 
discrimination against members of a group will also impinge upon religious adherence. In fact, 
if we map all cases of breaches of the right to religious freedom and all cases of breaches of 
the right against religious discrimination, the overlap might indeed be significant. This does 
nothing, however, to minimise the existence or significance of the conceptual and normative 
distinctions we are trying to draw out. Our argument is that it is not the purpose of 
discrimination law to secure religious freedom and nor is it the purpose of the right to religious 
freedom to reduce religious group disadvantage. In the next section we will also see important 
implications of the distinction with respect to the scope of the two rights. In particular, the 
scope of the two rights, the possibility of justifying their infringements and the relationality 
between rights-holders and duty-bearers are significantly different. In the final section, we will 
see that the areas where the two rights do not overlap are not insignificant. 
5. Implications of the Distinction 
The distinctions we have drawn between the two different religious interests (adherence and 
group membership) and their corresponding protector rights (freedom of religion and the right 
against religious discrimination) have important implications for legal doctrine.  In this section, 
we will outline four of these distinctions in more or less detail.  
5.1 Scope of the Rights 
The first implication of the distinction we have drawn between the two rights relates to the 
scope of the rights. What is the scope of the right to freedom of religion, justified on the basis 
of the need to respect decisional autonomy in matters of religion? The short answer, which 
follows from our capacious notion of religious adherence, is that it is very wide. The long 
answer recalls the three success conditions for any understanding of religion: that it should not 
be over-inclusive by treating my preference between (say) apples and oranges as a religious 
issue; that it should not be under-inclusive by privileging orthodox or majoritarian views within 
a religion or by privileging belief-based religions over practice-based ones; and that it should 
not be unfair to non-believers. We also note that the need for respecting decisional autonomy 
is weighty only because questions of religion (for many adherents, but also for many non-
adherents) are weighty.  
Translating these findings into a neat legal test is not going to be easy. It is our claim, however, 
that any test that accepts our rationale for protecting religious freedom is unlikely to demand 
more than the plausibility of the religious character of the object of the claim and the sincerity 
of the claimant’s adherence. At least conceptually, the plausibility inquiry is an intersubjective 
one, and the sincerity inquiry explores the committed dimension of religious (non)adherence.  
 
The plausibility test can be stated thus: 
“for a given demand by X to be permitted to φ (or not φ), might a reasonable person 
sufficiently familiar with the X’s socio-cultural context recognize that φ-ing has a 
religious character.”  
If such a person would recognize φ-ing as having a religious character, the plausibility 
threshold is met. This limb of the inquiry performs a gatekeeping function. It ensures that there 
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are some limits to the scope of religious freedom. It recognizes that religiosity is an 
intersubjective cultural phenomenon, i.e. it exists as a phenomenon shared between multiple 
conscious minds, and cannot be invented by a lone individual entirely out of thin air. To be 
clear, the test does not require the reasonable observer determine which, if any, specific religion 
demands or forbids φ-ing. The plausibility claim only tests the character of the claim 
intersubjectively, leaving its content to be determined entirely by the subjective, committed, 
sincere viewpoint of the adherent.  
The plausibility test also ensures fairness to non-believers by respecting their claim to refuse 
to φ. It should be obvious that what matters is not the religious character of the claim itself, but 
the religious character of the object of the claim (φ). For example, let us say that φ stood for 
‘Marrying a person of the same sex is immoral’. For a person making this claim, it is likely 
(although not necessary) that the object of the claim has a religious character (say, her religious 
beliefs tell her that same sex marriages are immoral). If so, however, a claim by a citizen that 
‘Marrying a person of the same sex is not immoral’ also has a religious object,67 insofar as it 
rests on the rejection of at least an aspect of her opponent’s religion. This formulation avoids 
the suggestion that atheists are also somehow ‘religious’. Consider another, arguably more 
paradigmatic, claim that has a religious object: ‘God exists’. Its negation—‘God does not 
exist’—also has a religious object simply because it is the negation of a religious object. This 
does not make the person making this claim the adherent of any religion, and their reasons for 
making it may have nothing to do with adherence to any religion.68  
A different way to put the point might be to use the claimants’ points of views. If the person 
making the claim views themselves as making a religious claim, the object of the claim itself 
acquires a religious character such that its negation will also retain such character. This is 
religious freedom, which after all, entails freedom of religion as well as (x’s) freedom from 
(y’s) religion.69 Our symmetry-seeking formula alone avoids the pitfalls of interpreting 
freedom from religion too narrowly or too broadly. Current legal practice affords too little 
protection to atheists by confining their interest in freedom of religion to not being coerced to 
follow or adopt any religion. While freedom from forced conversion is important, they cannot 
make any claims concerning other beliefs and practices that adherents of a religion can make. 
On the other hand, if we accord all beliefs and practices of atheists the same level of protection 
that religious beliefs and practices have, atheists will be protected to a far greater extent than 
religious adherents (for possibly everything they do might be seen as flowing from their 
‘atheism’). Our symmetric formula, on the other hand, irrevocably ties the scope of the 
protection for the non-religious to that of the religious—they sink and swim together. This 
symmetry, and the fairness inherent in it, is a key reason why it should be accepted. This insight 
has important implications that will be discussed in Section 5.2. 
The sincerity inquiry, on the other hand, ensures that the test is not too narrow. It asks: does the 
claimant sincerely hold that φ-ing (or not φ-ing) follows from their religious commitments 
(including, obviously, a commitment to rejection of religion). This test determines the content 
of the claim, and is not subject to any reasonableness or community-standard inquiry. Usual 
rules of evidence law should normally suffice for the purposes of the sincerity inquiry. In order 
to avoid an onerous and unnecessary evidentiary burden being placed on a religious claimant 
to prove their subjective state of mind, it is better for the court to presume sincerity unless there 
                                                   
67 Obviously, the primary reason for wanting to marry a person is likely to be different—probably romantic love 
or companionship. It does not matter that the religious dimension of the object of the claim is secondary, or even 
peripheral. 
68 Cf. DWORKIN, supra note 14.   
69 See James Nickel, Why Basic Liberties Are Bilateral, 17 L. & PHIL. 627 (1998). 
Draft 
19 
are reasons to displace the presumption. There is no objective merit-based test that φ-ing needs 
to satisfy in order to fall within the scope of the right. Autonomy demands that this be a 
subjective inquiry, with the inevitable implication that religious freedom potentially has a very 
wide and unpredictable scope.  
This wide scope is in part because religious adherence makes practical demands on believers 
not only with regard to worship, ritual, and other forms of religious performance but potentially 
in every aspect of their lives. The internal point of view of religious adherents may not even 
recognize the religious-secular distinction.70 Religious freedom therefore casts its net very 
wide. What makes the scope of the freedom even broader is the question of complicity: a 
believer’s religion may prohibit her not only from φ-ing, but also from becoming in any way 
complicit in the commission of φ (by others). For this reason, a belief that forbids the killing 
of animals may also require not eating meat, even if the animal was killed by another. Of 
course, whether such complicity is in fact prohibited by the belief in question will be subject 
to the sincerity and plausibility tests, but that is all.71 An adherent might believe, for example, 
that providing employee health insurance which has provisions for abortion or contraception 
could make him complicit in abortion or birth control, which his religion prohibits. One might 
claim that even hiring (and paying a salary to) an employee who might use her salary to get an 
abortion implicates his religious freedom. The point isn’t intended to be facetious.72 A 
potentially extremely wide and unpredictable scope for religious freedom is the inevitable 
consequence of adopting a largely subjective approach. But respecting decisional autonomy in 
matters of religion permits no other approach. Of course, this does not mean that the law will 
necessarily protect all these beliefs and their manifestations—that has to be determined at the 
justification stage. It is, however, more honest of law, and more respectful of a person’s 
decisional autonomy with regard to her religious (non)adherence, to be told that other 
considerations necessitate a restriction on her religious freedom, than to be told that what she 
claims is part of her religion is in fact not. 
Together, the tests of plausibility and sincerity satisfy all our success conditions. The 
plausibility test determines whether the claim in question is within the remit of our adopted 
rationale—decisional autonomy in matters of religion. The sincerity test allows a very wide 
space for autonomous decision-making within that space. A more demanding test would entail 
someone else (usually the state) telling an adherent what her religion in fact demands, and 
would therefore be incompatible with her decisional autonomy in relation to religion.73 Such 
objective tests would especially hurt heterodox and dissenting voices within religions, voices 
                                                   
70 Alvin Esau, "Islands of Exclusivity": Religious Organization and Employment Discrimination, 33 U. BRIT. 
COLUM. L. REV. 719, 732 (2000); REX ADHAR & IAN LEIGH, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE LIBERAL STATE 125 
(2013) (criticizing the distinction in relation to belief and practice); Joel Harrison, Autonomy and the Liberal 
Imagination in Jane Calderwood Norton’s Freedom of Religious Organizations, AUSTL. J. OF LEGAL PHIL. 
(forthcoming), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3014490. 
71 Cf. Douglas NeJaime and Reva Siegel, Religious Accommodation, and its Limits, in a Pluralist Society, in 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND LGBT RIGHTS: POSSIBILITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR FINDING COMMON GROUND 
(Robin Fretwell and William Eskridge, Jr. eds., 2018 forthcoming). 
72 See First Amendment Defense Bill, H.R. 2802, 114th Cong., (2015). 
73 Our claims are at sharp contrast with the practice in jurisdictions like India which only protect ‘essential 
practices’ of a religion, judged by experts in those religions. In the United Kingdom, a practice will be a 
manifestation of religious belief only if it is ‘intimately linked’ to that belief as judged by the court: see R 
(Playfoot) v. Governing Body of Millais School [2007] EWHC 1698 (Admin) at [21] (wearing of purity ring not 
protected by right to religious freedom because not intimately linked to religious belief in premarital chastity); R 
(Williamson) v. Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2005] UKHL 15, [2005] 2 AC 246 at [32],[63]. 
By contrast, courts in the United States have refused to inquire into the ‘centrality’ of a particular activity to a 
religion: Employment Division v. Smith,  494 U.S. 872, 886–887 (1990) (Scalia J.).   
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that most need to secure their religious freedom, and also hinder the evolution and dynamism 
of religions by ossifying dominant orthodox traditions.  
Before we move on, a word on whether pacifism and environmentalism can have a religious 
character and therefore be protected by the right to religious freedom. Pacificism and 
environmentalism may be aspects of certain religions (many Quakers, for example, believe that 
their religious adherence requires pacifism), but are otherwise unlikely to satisfy the 
plausibility test as such. Unlike atheistic claims whose objects have a religious character (even 
though the claim itself does not have a religious character), the objects of pacifist and 
environmental claims—qua their pacifism or environmentalism—do not have a religious 
character. This does not mean that they should not be protected. In bills of rights, religious 
freedom is usually articulated as ‘freedom of religion and belief’, and there may well be good 
normative and policy reasons to protect beliefs such as pacifism and environmentalism under 
such rights. This paper is not concerned, however, with what should populate the ‘and belief’ 
part of the right and expresses no opinion on that matter. All we wish to do is clarify the 
category distinction between claims based on Judaism, Taoism and atheism on the one hand, 
and those based on pacifism and environmentalism as such. 
In contrast with the right to freedom of religion, the scope of the right to be free from religious 
discrimination, on our account, is far narrower. Under British/European law, there are two ways 
of showing that an act is directly discriminatory: either by showing that the act makes 
intentional use of a protected characteristic (such as religion),74 or by showing that there is an 
exact coincidence between the beneficiaries and victims of a facially neutral act on the one 
hand and members of a protected group and its cognates on the other (e.g. an act that burdens 
all the Muslims it applies to, and no one who benefits is a Muslim).75 Given the diversity of 
religious adherence within a religious group, it is highly unlikely that a facially neutral act will 
achieve such exact coincidence in the context of religious discrimination. For example, a ban 
on all head-coverings will affect many Muslim women and many Sikh men, but it will not 
affect all Muslim women or all Sikh men that it applies to (since, not all Muslim women wear 
headscarves, nor do all Sikh men wear turbans). Such a ban is therefore more likely to amount 
to indirect discrimination, which demands instead that the protected group be affected 
disproportionately.76 In most cases of religious discrimination, an intentional use of religion as 
a classificatory basis (for example a ban on Islamic headscarves, or even a ban on all head-
coverings motivated by the desire to target Islamic headscarves) alone is likely to qualify as 
direct discrimination.77 Most other cases where members of a religious group are 
disproportionately burdened by a facially neutral policy will amount to indirect discrimination.  
Implicit in the preceding paragraph is a key claim that needs to be brought out more clearly. 
The claim is that the relevant religious group should be identified sociologically from the non-
committal perspective. This claim is important because the level at which a ‘group’ is identified 
for protection in discrimination law is not necessarily clear cut. While it is true that a general 
ban in head-coverings will not affect all Sikh men, it will affect all Sikh men who wear turbans 
as a religious requirement. On this interpretation, every act that burdens religious freedom will 
necessarily also amount to an act of discrimination (although the reverse will still not be true). 
It is the premise of this article, however, that the two rights are best understood to be performing 
                                                   
74 CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria AD v. Komisia za Zashtita ot Diskriminatsia (2015) Case C-83/14 (E.C.J.), 
[2015] I.R.L.R. 746 at [75], [76], [95]. 
75 Bull v. Hall [2013] UKSC 73, [2013] 1 W.L.R. 3741 at [19]. 
76 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Essop v. Home Office (UK Border Agency) [2017] UKSC 
27. 
77 See Bougnaoui v. Micropole SA (2017) Case C-188/15 (E.C.J.). 
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distinct functions in human rights adjudication. The difficulty with identifying the relevant 
religious group with reference to adherence is that it blurs the boundaries between the two 
rights: it fails to take the distinction between a person’s committed interest in religious 
(non)adherence and her non-committal interest in her religious group membership sufficiently 
seriously. It also fails to adequately take notice of the different normative foundations for the 
two rights. Furthermore, an adherence-based, rather than a sociological understanding of a 
religious group, will leave those perceived to be members of the group—even if they do not 
adhere to its religion—without the protection of discrimination law. After all, an atheist whose 
job application is rejected on the basis that she has a Jewish-sounding name is as much a victim 
of religious discrimination as one who is in fact committed to Judaism. For all these reasons, 
it is essential for the purposes of discrimination law that the relevant religious group should be 
identified sociologically from the non-committal perspective, rather than with reference to 
individual religious adherence.78 The implication of this claim is that the threshold required to 
be satisfied in order to make an antidiscrimination claim is relatively high. 
5.2 Relationality 
The second implication of the distinction we have drawn between the two rights concerns 
relationality. Human rights are typically considered to be claims against (‘vertical’) 
infringements by the state. It is accepted that the state may not, without adequate justification, 
infringe upon one’s freedom of religion or discriminate against her on the ground of religion. 
The controversial question is whether, and to what extent, these rights should be treated as 
claims in private (‘horizontal’) relationships. This subsection explores this issue. To be clear, 
we do not take the public person/private person distinction to be a rigid one. We accept that 
between the spectrum-defining end points of the state and a natural individual lies a whole 
range of bodies with different degrees of publicness.79  
 
We also note that the horizontality-verticality distinction does not completely capture various 
dimensions of relationality pertaining to the operation of a right. Even if a right does not have 
horizontal application, this does not mean that it has no role to play in defining private 
relationships. In order to appreciate what we are going to say in regard to relationality fully, it 
is helpful to first revisit Hohfeld’s famous analysis of rights in terms of how they structure 
relationships between persons. Hohfeld showed that legal rights were not some ‘things’ out 
there, but a type of relationship between persons. Furthermore, the language of ‘rights’ was 
ambiguous, and could refer to any of four different types of relationships: liberty,80 claim,81 
power and immunity. A brief, jargon-laden, snapshot of Hohfeld’s categories can be glanced 
over in the table below: 
 
 Jural Opposites: Jural Correlatives: 
Primary 
Concepts 
If A has a claim, then A lacks a no-
claim. 
If A has a claim, then B has a duty. 
                                                   
78 The UK Court of Appeal conducts a similar analysis to determine whether a no-neck-jewelry policy 
disproportionately impacts cross-wearing Christians: Eweida v. British Airways Plc. [2010] EWCA Civ 80 [18]–
[19]. Although the Eur. Ct. H.R. disagreed with the outcome of the judgment, it did so on religious freedom 
grounds rather than on religious discrimination basis. 
79 See KHAITAN, supra note 25, at ch. 7. 
80 Hohfeld called this ‘privilege’, but liberty is generally accepted as a better term in the Hohfeldian literature. 
81 Again, Hohfeld referred to this concept as a ‘right’, but that could lead to confusion between the sub-category 
and the broader category he was disambiguating. The literature now mostly sticks to ‘claim’ as a better descriptor 
of what he intended.  
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If A has a liberty, then A lacks a 
duty. 
If A has a liberty, then B has a no-
claim. 
Secondary 
Concepts 
If A has a power, then A lacks a 
disability. 
If A has a power, then B has a 
liability. 
If A has an immunity, then A lacks a 
liability. 
If A has an immunity, then B has a 
disability. 
 
It is unnecessary to explain these well-known categories in detail. The most important 
distinction, for our purposes, is the one between a liberty and a claim. My liberty to φ is not 
the same thing as my claim that you let me φ or facilitate my φ-ing. When I have a liberty to 
φ, it simply means that you do not have a claim against me to not φ. On the other hand, when 
you have a claim against me to not φ, I have a duty (to you) to not φ, and am therefore not at 
liberty to φ. 
 
Some examples should clarify the complex Hohfeldian definitions of these concepts. In a 
jurisdiction that has a finders-keepers law, I am at liberty to pick up an unclaimed ten dollar 
note lying on a public footpath. Suppose that you and I see the note at the same time, but you 
are quicker than I am and pick it up before me. Although I had a liberty to pick it up before 
you did, after you have done so, I am no longer in a position to exercise that liberty. Moreover, 
I have no claim against you. The situation is likely to be different if the note was found on my 
property. In this case, the law is likely to recognize my claim over the note found on my 
property against you. You would likely have a duty to give me the note. Take another example: 
I am at liberty to speak, but I do not—normally—have any claim against you to listen to what 
I have to say. In certain circumstances, however, I may well have a claim to be heard, for 
example by a court which is trying me for an offence. A final example: in most liberal 
jurisdictions, I am at liberty to have consensual sex with any other adult person. But I have no 
claim against any other person to have sex with me (although some jurisdictions still recognize 
the concept of ‘conjugal rights’, which grants a person a claim to have sex with their spouse). 
It should be clear by now that a horizontally applicable ‘right’ gives me a Hohfeldian claim 
against you. But even if the ‘right’ is only a mere liberty (between private persons), and 
therefore lacks a horizontal dimension, it does not mean that its operation is irrelevant to how 
private relationships are structured. If I have the liberty to φ, another private person may 
frustrate its exercise in certain permitted ways (e.g. by picking up the dollar bill before me). 
But they may not prevent me from exercising it, or visit any penalty on me for my having 
exercised it (whether directly or by using the law’s coercive power). These examples bring out 
another feature of the distinction: whether a legal system treats a right as a liberty or a claim is 
a normative choice that it makes. It is not a matter that conceptual analysis can settle.82 The 
issue before us is how the two rights (both of which are claims against the state) should 
structure relations between private persons. We will show that the law’s treatment of the right 
against religious discrimination as a (limited) claim between private persons is justified, but 
that the right to religious freedom should remain a liberty in private contexts. 
 
Our claim is that a right to religious freedom should remain a liberty in private contexts. Recall 
our plausibility test for determining whether a person is claiming an interest in religious 
(non)adherence: 
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“for a given demand by X to be permitted to φ (or not φ), might a reasonable person 
sufficiently familiar with the X’s socio-cultural context recognize that φ-ing has a 
religious character.”  
Under our approach (designed to respect the decisional autonomy of the religious adherent and 
the non-adherent), if φ-ing has a religious character, not φ-ing must have it too. Thus, every 
claim by X to be permitted to φ against Y could be met with an opposite claim by Y to not be 
subject to φ-ing by X. So, a claim by a Hindu man that the eating of beef by non-Hindus 
breaches his religious freedom will always face a potential reply from a non-Hindu beef eater 
who does not wish to be subject to Hindu religious norms. The problem can be avoided only if 
Y herself does not possess the right to religious freedom—which is true for the state, but not 
true for private individuals. 
It could be argued that religious freedom could still be treated as a claim, rather than a liberty. 
This is because the same claim made on either side of a dispute would lead to their mutual 
cancellation only if the two claims are of equal weight. A judicial balancing of the opposite 
claims could, in theory, evaluate their respective weight, intensity or centrality. These inquiries, 
however, would require judicial interrogation of the internal and subjective dimensions of 
religious (non)adherence—something that, on our approach, would be inimical to religious 
freedom and should be avoided as far as possible. It is better therefore if religious freedom is 
treated, in the context of private relationships, as a liberty rather than a claim. In fact, this 
normative insight might hold for most rights that track our interest in the freedom to pursue the 
good (as opposed to rights that directly track our interest in the good).83 
The right against religious discrimination does not suffer a similar difficulty concerning 
simultaneous claims. First, while it is theoretically possible for both parties to a dispute to have 
a simultaneous claim of religious discrimination against each other arising out of the same set 
of facts, these cases are likely to be rare.84 Whatever little possibility there might have been for 
such cases to exist is obviated by the fact that in most common law jurisdictions, the duty to 
not discriminate applies only in specified spheres of quasi-public activities (such as 
employment, housing and retail) and flows uni-directionally (i.e. from the landlord to the 
tenant, but not the other way around). The limited horizontality of discrimination law is 
justified not because of claims that cancel each other out, but for other reasons that need not 
concern us here.85 Even if, somehow, one ends up with a case with mutually antagonistic 
antidiscrimination claims on both sides, since these claims are founded upon public, non-
committal viewpoints, there is no reason for the state to refrain from adjudicating upon their 
respective merit, cogency, weight and so on. For this reason, horizontal application of 
discrimination law does not pose institutional challenges comparable to those posed by that of 
religious freedom. 
Religious freedom should remain a liberty, at least in cases where both parties possess the right 
to religious freedom. Whether it can be a claim against quasi-public bodies (like corporations) 
that lie in between the state and natural individuals, would depend on whether these non-natural 
                                                   
83 See Section 3 above. 
84 It is also difficult to think of examples of cases where both parties have simultaneous claims of discrimination 
against each other on different grounds. Even in Bull v. Hall, where Christian Bed and Breakfast owners who 
refused to give a double bedroom to a gay couple complained of religious discrimination, they did so against the 
state, and not against the gay couple. See Bull v. Hall [2013] UKSC 73. 
85 For details on these reasons see KHAITAN, supra note 25, at ch. 7. 
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persons possess the right to religious freedom.86 We will leave this thorny question to another 
day.  
5.3 Non-Zero-Sum Benefits, Expressive Harms, and Religious Establishment 
The third key distinction between freedom of religion and the right against religious 
discrimination is with regard to their attitude to non-zero-sum benefits. Non-zero-sum benefits 
to any one religion/religious group do not violate religious freedom, but they do discriminate. 
Non-zero-sum benefits are benefits that are given to the adherence of any one religion, that do 
not burden adherence to other religions. Examples of such benefits include a provision for a 
special subsidy to Muslims who wish to undertake the Haj pilgrimage, for a Christian chapel 
at the workplace, or for the establishment of Buddhism as the state religion. These benefits are 
non-zero-sum, at least in the material sense, because while they benefit the adherence of one 
religion, they do not—on their own—burden adherence to any other or to no religion at all. 
Provision for a Haj subsidy does nothing to constrain a devout Hindu’s ability to adhere to her 
religion. These non-zero-sum benefits, we argue, do not infringe the religious freedom of non-
adherents of the religion being benefited. There may well be (and, we will shortly argue, there 
indeed are) good reasons why the state should avoid selectively benefiting adherence to certain 
religions, but the protection of religious freedom is not one of them. This argument follows 
from our underlying rationale for religious freedom—there is nothing in non-zero-sum benefits 
for adherence to a religion that, on its own, affects a person’s decisional autonomy with respect 
to her own (non)adherence. 
Two objections might be raised against our claim that non-zero-sum benefits do not affect the 
religious freedom of non-adherents. First, it might be argued, that benefits for the chosen 
religion, even if non-zero-sum, would incentivise adherence to it (at least by those motivated 
more by worldly benefits than by ultimate salvation). While this may be true, recall that our 
decisional autonomy-based account is highly subjective and protects religious adherence of the 
intense and the frivolous, and does not interrogate one’s motives for adherence (so long as the 
adherence itself is sincere and not a sham). If so, there is no cost to decisional autonomy unless 
an adherent’s will is interfered with through coercion or manipulation. A zero-sum-benefit to 
adherents of another religion, on its own, is unlikely to amount to such interference. 
A second objection might be that even though non-zero-sum benefits to adherents of one 
religion do not materially burden non-adherence of that religion, might they not burden it 
expressively?87 Does not the establishment of Buddhism, for example, as the state religion 
express the state’s recognition of its superiority over other religions? It is true that non-zero-
sum benefits to religious adherence may well entail such expressive messages. However, legal 
recognition that religious freedom can be infringed by expressive harm alone would be 
destructive of the guarantee of religious freedom itself. Such recognition would undermine the 
religious freedom of non-adherents to freely criticise, reject, and even condemn the religions 
they do not adhere to. After all, as we have seen, a capacious understanding of religious 
freedom founded upon the importance of decisional autonomy, protects adherence as well as 
non-adherence. Just as it protects the intense as well as the relaxed adherent, it must also protect 
the tolerant as well as the incensed non-adherent. Comparable to the difficulty with horizontal 
                                                   
86 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). The Eur. Ct. H.R. in Eweida applied it as a claim against 
a large corporation—this may well be justified, but it needs cogent reasons that the court failed to provide: see 
Eweida v. United Kingdom, 57 Eur. H.R. Rep. 8 (2013). 
87 An argument of this type was made by O’Connor J. in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (‘Endorsement 
sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an 
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community’) and 
Sachs J. in S. v. Lawrence 1997 (4) SA 1176 (CC) (S.Afr.) (‘negative radiating symbolic effect’). 
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enforcement of religious freedom, recognition of expressive or symbolic harms as burdens on 
religious adherence could undermine religious freedom itself.  
Even if one accepts the argument in the preceding section, could the prohibition on inflicting 
expressive harm on religious adherence be confined to the state? Surely, the state itself does 
not have a claim to freedom of religion? That much is true. However, while it is certainly 
desirable that state officials do not condemn any religion, certain specific religious 
requirements will frequently come into conflict with state policy or public morality—an across 
the board prohibition of expressive harms, even when applied to the state alone—is not without 
problems. This is especially so if one adopts an objective standard for determining expressive 
harms, i.e. when the symbolic insult to the religion is judged not based on the intention behind 
the symbolic act, but its public meaning. For this reason, it is best to keep expressive harms 
outside the remit of what counts as ‘burdening’ religious adherence. On this understanding, 
religious establishment, on its own, may well be compatible with religious freedom for all.88 
On the other hand, benefits to the membership of a religious group to the exclusion of others, 
whether zero-sum or non-zero-sum, paradigmatically constitute discrimination. While 
religious adherence needs to be burdened in absolute terms for one’s religious freedom to be 
infringed, members of a religious group need only be disadvantaged comparative to another 
group for the act to qualify as discriminatory. While there is some debate in discrimination law 
over whether non-comparative harms to a protected group amount to (prima facie) 
discrimination, there is no debate over the fact that comparative harms always do. It may be 
that no employee is entitled to a bonus, but if a company pays a bonus to all its Christian 
employees but denies it to all others, it would constitute a clear case of discrimination. 
Discrimination law has also come to register exclusively expressive harms too.89  
None of this is surprising if we bear the underlying function of discrimination law in mind: to 
reduce and to ultimately eliminate (pervasive, abiding and substantial) relative group 
disadvantage. Discrimination law, at its fundamental level, cares for how groups fare relative 
to each other, in material, political and socio-cultural terms (although, it does so only because 
that has an absolute impact on the success of the lives of individual members of the relatively 
disadvantaged group). Thus, non-zero-sum benefits and expressive harms suffice to trigger a 
discrimination claim.  
Each of the three examples of non-zero-sum burdening of adherence we gave above—
pilgrimage subsidy, workplace chapels and religious establishment—all of them benefit not 
just adherence but also group membership. While we argued that none of them—without 
more—is likely to violate religious freedom, we also think that each of them is a textbook 
instance of prima facie direct discrimination on the ground of religion. The reason should be 
obvious—non-zero-sum benefits do not violate religious freedom, but they do discriminate. 
5.4 Overlaps between the Two Rights 
Thus far we have been arguing that the two religion rights—religious freedom and freedom 
from religious discrimination—are distinct human rights and, as such, protect distinct human 
interests and distinct (although sometimes overlapping) aspects of religion. Highlighting their 
distinctiveness does not deny significant overlaps in their scope. The table below illustrates 
how these rights protect distinct aspects of religion. 
                                                   
88 See Rex Ahdar & Ian Leigh, Is Establishment Consistent with Religious Freedom?, 49 MCGILL L. J. 635 (2004).  
89 See Tarunabh Khaitan, Dignity as an Expressive Norm: Neither Vacuous Nor a Panacea, 32 OXF. J. OF LEGAL 
STUD. 1 (2012).  
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 Intentional Unintentional 
 
1. 
Affecting 
adherence 
1.1 Non-Zero-
Sum 
Benefiting 
1.1.1 State A1  (DD; RF)90 A3 (ID?; RF)91 
1.1.2 Private A2 (DD; RF)92 A4 (ID?; RF)93 
1.2 Burdening 
or Zero-Sum-
Benefiting 
1.2.1 State B1 (DD; RF)94 B3 (ID?; RF)95 
1.2.2 Private B2 (DD; RF)96 B4 (ID?; RF)97 
 
2. Affecting group 
membership 
2.1 State C1 (DD; RF?)98 C3 (ID; RF)99 
2.2 Private C2 (DD; RF)100 C4 (ID; RF)101 
 
 
In row 1, we map the various ways in which religious adherence may be interfered with. Row 
1.1 tracks non-zero-sum benefits for religious adherence by state and private persons. Row 1.2 
captures other forms of interference with religious adherence. Applying what we learnt in 
Section 5.2, no interference by a private actor amounts to a breach of religious freedom (RF in 
rows 1.1.2 and 1.2.2). However, such acts—if intentional—would amount to prima facie direct 
discrimination (DD) if the private actor is one regulated by discrimination law, and may amount 
to indirect discrimination if the act is unintentional but disproportionately impacts a religious 
group (ID?). When the actor is the state, the conclusions with regard to discrimination are 
similar in rows 1.1.1 and 1.2.1.  
                                                   
90 See, e.g., Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2412 (2011), 54 Eur. H.R. Rep. 3 (2012) (cross in 
public school classroom) and Establishment cases from the United States such as Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 
677 (2005) (public display of Ten Commandments). Here the state provides a non-zero-sum benefit to one 
religion/group, but not to others. 
91 An example of unintentionally benefiting adherence to a particular religion in a non-zero-sum manner would 
be a preference in public employment for candidates who know more than one language, assuming that this is 
likely to benefit Orthodox Jews and Muslims who know Hebrew or Arabic for religious reasons. 
92 Provision of an Anglican chapel at a private workplace would be an example of a non-zero-sum benefit to the 
adherence of one religion. 
93 A university that has a flexible holiday policy for academic staff would benefit adherence to those religions that 
require a holiday. 
94 Examples would include state prohibition of the Muslim headscarf or kosher slaughter (shechita). 
95 For examples of unintentional burdening of religious adherence see Employment Division, Department of 
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (a prohibition on the consumption of peyote); R 
(Ghai) v. Newcastle City Council [2011] QB 591 (a prohibition on the outdoor cremation of a dead body); 
Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567 (Can.) (a requirement that driver licences 
include a photo). 
96 E.g., a private employer banning its employees from wearing the Muslim headscarf. 
97 Examples of B4 include a private employer’s workplace dress code that prohibits wearing of all head-coverings 
or jewelry.  
98 E.g., a state that has different classes of citizenship or imposes differential levels of taxes depending on religion. 
99 See, e.g., Naeem v. Secretary of State for Justice [2017] UKSC 27 where it was found that Muslim chaplains 
were at a disadvantage in the pay scale because of their shorter lengths of service (the Prison Service having not 
employed Muslim chaplains on a salaried basis until 2002). 
100 An example here might be an employer who refuses to interview an applicant because they have a Jewish 
surname. 
101E.g., a requirement that a high school diploma is needed for higher paid positions, which then results in 
members of certain religious groups being disqualified at a substantially higher rate than members of other 
groups (a ‘religious’ Griggs case: Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)). 
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Although we have suggested that intentional cases of burdening religious adherence in row 1.2, 
whether by the state or a private person, will be prima facie direct discrimination, one 
qualification is needed—it is possible to have a case where all forms of religious 
(non)adherence were burdened.102 In such cases, it is possible that there is no direct 
discrimination. Even in such cases, it is highly unlikely that all forms of religious adherence 
will be burdened equally—if some forms are burdened disproportionately over others, a prima 
facie case of indirect discrimination could still be made.  
As we know from the preceding section, if the state interferes by providing non-zero-sum 
benefits for adherence to any particular religion, religious freedom is not violated (RF). The 
only prima facie breaches of religious freedom in row 1 happen under 1.2.1, where the state 
interferes either by burdening or by providing a zero-sum benefit for religious adherence.  
When the action affects group membership, rather than adherence, in relevant ways (row 2), 
that is prima facie discriminatory by definition. Of the various possibilities, it is only where the 
state intentionally discriminates that is it possible that religious freedom may also be breached. 
Take for example a law that denies voting rights to the members of a certain religious group. 
Even though being able to vote is (let us assume) not required for adherence to that religion, a 
directly discriminatory law of such magnitude has clear implications for religious adherence 
as well. Each category in this table has a distinct example that cannot be placed in any other 
category. A different way to visualise these overlaps is through the following diagram: 
 
We know that direct discrimination and indirect discrimination are mutually exclusive. Cases 
that amount to prima facie direct discrimination but do not engage religious freedom (green 
part of the first circle on the left) include A1, A2, B2 and C2. Cases that are prima facie indirect 
discrimination but not a prima facie breach of religious freedom (light blue part of the circle 
on the right) include C3 and C4, and potentially A3, A4 and B4 (depending on whether the 
disproportionate impact standard is satisfied). Possible overlap between direct discrimination 
and religious freedom occurs in cases such as B1 and C1; whereas possible overlaps between 
                                                   
102 Achbita v. G4S Secure Solutions NV (2017) Case C-157/15 (E.C.J.) was arguably one such case. For a critique 
of the decision see Lucy Vickers, Achbita and Bougnaoui: One Step Forward and Two Steps Back for Religious 
Diversity in the Workplace, 8 EUR. LAB. L. J. 232 (2017). 
Direct 
Discrimination
Religious 
Freedom
Indirect 
Discrimination
A1, A2, 
B2, C2 
B1, 
C1 
A3?, A4?, 
B4?, C3, 
C4 
B3? B3 
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indirect discrimination and religious freedom includes cases under B3. B3 cases that fail to 
satisfy the disproportionate impact standard of indirect discrimination liability constitute the 
residual red part of the middle circle. 
We have explained how the two religion rights—religious freedom and freedom from religious 
discrimination—are distinct human rights that protect distinct human interests and distinct 
aspects of religion. These aspects of religion can, of course, overlap but we have illustrated in 
the table and diagram above how there remain distinct areas with no overlap. 
Given that these two rights protect distinct human interests and distinct aspects of religion, 
whether and how their infringement may be justified can differ. Both rights under 
consideration—freedom of religion and the right against religious discrimination—are 
qualified rights that admit to the possibility of justification.103 This is not unusual as few human 
rights are absolute. Most tend to be qualified rights, in the sense that their infringement may 
occasionally be justified for sufficiently weighty countervailing reasons. Different jurisdictions 
characterize the justification analysis differently (with proportionality being the most popular 
analytic frame). Most, however, consider factors such as the weight of and impact on the 
interests/rights of both parties and the public interest involved, the nexus between the impugned 
act and the end it seeks to achieve, and the judiciary’s relative institutional capacity and 
expertise in second-guessing the political decision under challenge. Given our position on 
relationality—that the right against religious discrimination is only a limited claim between 
private persons and that the right to religious freedom is a liberty, not a claim, in private 
contexts—the comments in this section apply only to the justification of state action that 
infringes upon either of the two rights.  
We turn first to infringement of the right against religious discrimination. When a claimant has 
made a prima facie case of religious discrimination, the intensity of judicial scrutiny is typically 
very high.104 This is because religious group membership is not only normatively irrelevant to 
most state actions, it is also descriptively irrelevant. In other words, not only should the state 
not act based on a person’s membership of a religious group when it adversely affects 
vulnerable groups, religious group membership is rarely connected rationally with any 
legitimate state goal. In fact, its entanglement with state action often reflects prejudice against, 
hostility towards, stereotyping of, or indifference to the needs of religious minorities. Direct 
and even indirect discrimination often (although not necessarily) capture these impulses.105 
This is why a presumptive judicial suspicion of prima facie cases of religious (and, indeed, 
other forms of) discrimination is justified. It is true that the use of religious group membership 
as a basis for state action may be justified even outside the context of affirmative action—
however, such cases will be rare for direct religious discrimination.  
In indirect discrimination cases, where a neutral action disproportionately affects a religious 
group,106 the possibility of justification is likely to depend on contextual factors that usually 
                                                   
103 It is true that in statutory contexts governing private relationships, certain forms of discrimination are treated 
as not justifiable. But in constitutional law, the right against discrimination almost always admits to the possibility 
of justification, even though sometimes the threshold for realizing that possibility might be extremely high. 
104 In keeping with the practice of most jurisdictions outside the United States, we are assuming that affirmative 
action measures do not constitute prima facie discrimination. See generally, KHAITAN, supra note 25, at ch. 8.  
105 See Sophia Moreau, The Moral Seriousness of Indirect Discrimination, in FOUNDATIONS OF INDIRECT 
DISCRIMINATION LAW (Hugh Collins & Tarunabh Khaitan eds., 2018). See also Sandy Steel & Tarunabh Khaitan, 
Wrongs, Group Disadvantage and the Legitimacy of Indirect Discrimination Law, in FOUNDATIONS OF INDIRECT 
DISCRIMINATION LAW (Hugh Collins & Tarunabh Khaitan eds., 2018).   
106 We are assuming that these neutral rules are not motivated by prejudice or hostility. Such rules would be little 
more than a pretext for direct discrimination and will be treated by the courts as such. 
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inform the proportionality analysis (such as the respective weight of the state’s and the 
claimant’s interests and the extent to which they are harmed or served by the proposed action). 
The non-committal interest in not having one’s religious group suffer disadvantage is readily 
cognizable by courts—it is the sort of thing that a public judicial perspective can grasp and 
evaluate alongside the interests of the state and any third parties.  
Determining the justifiability of an act that infringes upon religious freedom, on the other hand, 
is generally more difficult. The degree of difficulty will vary depending on whether the two 
rights overlap. Admittedly, some cases are easy. Often religious freedom is violated because of 
prejudice against, or hostility towards, a particular religion. Such tainted cases will be 
unjustified even under the most deferential judicial scrutiny, and in any case are also likely to 
amount to unjustified direct religious discrimination. In fact, the problem of the appropriate 
standard of review for religious freedom cases does not matter, at least in practical terms, for 
all overlap cases where both rights are engaged. Wherever we peg the judicial standard of 
review for religious freedom cases generally, it is unlikely to be higher than the very high 
standard of review in discrimination cases. In overlap cases, therefore, if religious 
discrimination is justified, any breach of religious freedom is always going to be justified as 
well. 
Difficulty arises in those cases where the two rights do not overlap—i.e. where religious 
freedom is engaged, but there is no prima facie case of religious discrimination. As we saw in 
the preceding sections, such cases are likely to involve neutral rules that burden religious 
adherence, but do not amount to a disproportionate impact on a religious group (and, therefore, 
do not constitute prima facie indirect discrimination).107 In such cases, it is very difficult for an 
institution like the judiciary to appropriately balance the publicly intelligible interests of the 
state (such as its interest in photo driver licences or in prohibiting open air cremations) and 
third parties (such as a gay couple seeking rental accommodation) with the committed interest 
of religious adherents (such as those with a religious objection to being photographed, a 
religious requirement that they be cremated in the open, or a religious disapproval of gay 
relationships). A court committed to religious freedom, on our account, cannot adopt the 
committed perspective of the adherent itself (were such adoption even possible)—doing so, we 
know now, is inimical to religious freedom itself. Without the benefit of this committed 
perspective, however, the court cannot judge the weight or the intensity of the adherent’s 
interests involved. All it can do is check whether the religious freedom claim is plausible, 
sincere, and accompanied by other rights claims (such as freedoms of expression, movement, 
association, conscience, privacy and so on). When these other rights are also involved, the 
claim will usually be weightier, but only because of the involvement of these other rights. In 
short, with respect to religious freedom itself, a court has little choice but to adopt a relatively 
hands-off approach towards the impugned decision. The result is that religious freedom claims, 
when not accompanied by a discrimination claim, have difficulty in succeeding. 
Thus, in a case where (i) religious freedom is infringed by a general law, (ii) not motivated by 
any animus against a particular religion, (iii) which does not simultaneously constitute a prima 
facie case of direct or indirect discrimination, (iv) where significant non-committal interests of 
the public or of third parties are involved,108 and (v) where the claimant’s other protected 
freedoms (of expression etc.) do not demand otherwise, a court should adopt a light-touch 
deferential review of state action. This is an inevitable consequence of the very vast, 
                                                   
107 Justice Sedley found that a neutral ban on all jewelry in Eweida was one such case—it did infringe upon 
religious freedom of a worker who wanted to wear a cross, but did not amount to a disproportionate impact on 
Christians as a group: Eweida v. British Airways Plc. [2010] EWCA Civ 80.   
108 See Siegel, supra note 71. 
Draft 
30 
subjectively-determined, and unpredictable scope of the right to religious freedom—a right 
that (unavoidably) casts its net so wide must have a shallow bite for the political state to remain 
functional. We also note that a light-touch approach is not the same as a hands-off approach. 
Even in these cases, there might be reasons for judicial intervention. After all, while courts 
cannot weight or appreciate the subjective religious interest of the adherent, they can and must 
recognize that the subjective interest is a species of the important general interest we all have 
in our decisional autonomy in matters of religious adherence.   
6. Conclusion 
We have shown that we have two distinct interests when it comes to matters of religion: an 
interest in our ability to (not) adhere to our religious commitments, and a separate interest in 
ensuring that our religious group does not suffer relative socio-cultural, political or material 
disabilities in comparison with other religious groups. The protection of these distinct interests 
is the primary concern respectively of the right to freedom of religion and the right against 
religious discrimination. Consequently, we argue that the scope of the right to freedom of 
religion is extremely wide, whereas that of the right against religious discrimination is 
relatively narrow. However, we say, the former right should only be available against the state, 
whereas it is normatively permissible to apply the antidiscrimination right against some non-
state actors. Furthermore, while religious freedom is not engaged when one religious group 
receives non-zero-sum benefits, this may well amount to religious discrimination. Finally, we 
map the areas where the two rights overlap, and cases where only one of the two rights is 
engaged. This careful parsing of the two rights brings significant clarity to the politically 
charged debates on these rights relating to religion. 
 
